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Abstract: 
Carbon sequestration in agricultural soils is considered as an option of greenhouse gas 
mitigation in many countries. But, the economic potential is limited by the dynamic 
process of saturation and the opportunity cost of land use change. In addition, this 
article shows that permanence cannot, in general, be achieved in the strict sense of 
maintaining the soil carbon stock on an increased equilibrium level. Rather, a cyclical 
pattern with periodical release of sequestered carbon can be economically optimal from 
both the farmers’ and societal point of view.  
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1 Introduction 
The use of biological sinks is regarded as an appealing option of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
mitigation in many countries. It is explicitly considered in the Kyoto protocol as an 
alternative measure besides the reduction of energy-intensive activities and investment 
in less carbon-intensive technologies. In order to make use of this climate policy option, 
countries can declare pieces of land as selected for carbon sequestration and balance the 
net amount of carbon that is fixed in the corresponding soils and forest biomass against 
their national GHG emissions. 
The scientific basis for the assessment of sequestration activities is compiled in a special 
report of the IPCC (Watson et al., 2000) which provides a comprehensive state-of-the-
art examination of the global carbon cycle and the scientific and technical implications 
of carbon sequestration.
1 It shows that the amount of carbon stored globally in soils is 
much larger than the global carbon stock in vegetation,
2 and that “changes in soil carbon 
stocks are at least as important for carbon budgets as changes in vegetation carbon 
stocks” (Watson et al., 2000: 26). Accordingly, attention must not only be given to 
afforestation, forest management and agro-forestry, but also to the various options of 
soil carbon sequestration. The latter can be used to partly reverse negative effects of 
cultivation and partly recover past losses of soil organic carbon (SOC) from agricultural 
land. Thus, soil carbon sequestration can enhance agricultural productivity in the long 
run and by this way particularly contribute to sustainable development in less developed 
countries (Robert, 2001; Lipper and Cavatassi, 2004).  
Various authors emphasise that farmers may benefit from providing sequestration 
services to private markets or government programs (Sandor and Skees, 1999; Marland 
et al., 2001a; McCarl and Schneider, 2001; Antle and Diagana, 2003; Young, 2003; 
Lehtonen et al., 2006). In addition, society might enjoy multiple side-benefits of soil 
carbon sequestration, such as improved water quality, biodiversity and landscape 
                                                 
1    To get a concise insight in the role of agriculture in the global carbon cycle, see also Lal (2004a, b). 
2    The ratio between the carbon stock in the soil and in vegetation ranges from 1:1 in tropical forests to 
5:1 in boreal forests, and it is much higher for grasslands, wetlands and croplands (Watson et al., 
2000: 4, 31). – 4 – 
amenities (McCarl and Schneider, 2001; Feng et al., 2004, 2007). Finally, different 
economic studies reveal that soil carbon sequestration through conservation tillage and 
land use change, respectively, can constitute a cost-effective option in a nation’s GHG 
mitigation portfolio with some considerable potential (e.g., Antle et al., 2001, 2003, 
2007; McCarl and Schneider, 2000, 2001; Pautsch et al., 2001). However, one 
important feature of soil carbon sequestration is largely neglected in existing studies. 
This is the non-linearity and saturation of the dynamic process of soil carbon 
accumulation and its impact on the net present value of a sequestration program. 
Related problems are the threat of future carbon releases and the question of 
permanence. 
The aim of this article is to investigate from an economic perspective the climate policy 
option of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils with special consideration of the 
dynamics and permanence issues. In particular, our focus is on the consequences for 
contract and policy design that follow from the non-linearity and saturation process. The 
remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
the prospects of soil carbon sequestration. Section 3 is devoted to an introduction of the 
economic allocation problem, incentive schemes and the cost of permanent 
sequestration. This is further developed in Section 4 with special consideration of the 
non-linearity in the sequestration process. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a general 
evaluation of soil carbon sequestration from an economic perspective. 
2  Prospects of soil carbon sequestration  
In contrast to carbon fixation by afforestation and improved forest management, the 
idea of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils only appeared in the economics 
literature in recent years. Following numerous scientific assessments,
3 these studies 
have been motivated by the need to evaluate the feasibility and competitiveness of soil 
carbon sequestration from an economic perspective. They investigate the role which 
economic incentives could play in inducing farmers to adopt practices that would 
increase the amount of carbon in the soil. Such incentives could be given through direct 
government payments or private markets. In either case, contracts between buyers 
                                                 
3   See Watson et al. (2000) for an overview. – 5 – 
(emitters of GHGs) and sellers (farmers) of carbon sequestration services would specify 
the payment mechanisms and other terms for either a government program or carbon 
markets (Antle and McCarl, 2002).  
Candidate measures of soil carbon sequestration include conservation tillage, ley-arable 
farming, partial elimination of bare fallow, conversion of cropland to permanent 
grassland, and restoration of wetlands and organic soils (Watson et al., 2000, ch. 4; Lal, 
2004). Related flows and stocks of SOC are not uniform across geographical regions, 
but vary with soil types and climatic conditions. Correspondingly, the suitability of 
sequestration measures can be different from one location to another. For instance, 
conservation tillage is seen as the primary means for increasing soil carbon in Iowa 
(Pautsch et al., 2001), while conversion of cropland into permanent grass and 
elimination of bare fallow through continuous cropping are considered adequate for 
Montana (Antle et al., 2001). In the latter case, site-specific marginal sequestration costs 
range from 12 to 140 US$/t C for continuous cropping and from 50 to 500 US$/t C for 
conversion of cropland into permanent grassland.  
The difference in the cost of these two sequestration activities is primarily a 
consequence of differences in policy design, rather than due to an effective difference in 
marginal costs of sequestration. Under the continuous cropping scenario, farmers are 
assumed in the analysis of Antle et al. (2001) to receive payments on a per hectare basis 
only for fields switched to continuous cropping, whereas all cropland and pasture is 
assumed eligible for payments under the permanent grass scenario. In principle, this 
differentiation in eligibility has the same effect as the distinction between payments to 
all adopters of conservation tillage and payments to new adopters only that is made in 
the study of Pautsch et al. (2001). Their estimates of average sequestration costs in Iowa 
are much higher than those of Antle et al. for Montana. To a certain extent, this higher 
cost is a consequence of the initial adoption rate of conservation tillage, which was 
already above 60 percent in the reference year 1992. 
With a more comprehensive approach, using the integrated assessment model 
ASMGHG for the US agriculture and forestry sector, McCarl and Schneider (2001) 
show that the economic potential of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils largely 
exceeds the potential of abating methane and nitrous oxide emissions from US – 6 – 
agriculture. For carbon prices below 100 US$/t C, it also exceeds the potential of carbon 
sequestration through afforestation. Compared to cost estimates for non-agricultural 
compliance with a Kyoto-like target that averaged between 44 and 89 US$/t C, with a 
maximum estimate of 227 US$/t C (cf. McCarl and Schneider, 2001; Antle and McCarl, 
2002), these figures illustrate the competitiveness of agricultural soil C sequestration 
with other measures of GHG mitigation in the USA. Together with more recent studies 
of Antle et al. (2007) for the Upper Mississippi Basin and Feng et al. (2007) for the 
Central United States, these results indicate a large potential of soil carbon sequestration 
in the US that could be realised with rather moderate carbon prices. 
In contrast, Manley et al. (2005) conclude in a meta-analysis across 52 studies that “in 
most places creating carbon offsets by changing tillage practices is simply not cost-
effective.” Their results show a range of sequestration costs from a low of 1.94 US$/t C 
to well over 300 US$/t C, depending on region, crop grown and other factors. Thus, 
from an economic point of view, one cannot draw a general conclusion in favour or 
against soil carbon sequestration. Rather, situation factors must be taken into account. 
This is also supported by results from different European studies that reveal substantial 
differences in the cost-effectiveness of soil carbon sequestration in different countries.
4 
Thus, the use of soil carbon sequestration as a GHG mitigation measure must be 
carefully evaluated from both scientific and economic perspectives. This particularly 
requires adequate consideration of the relevant geographical and political 
circumstances, and of the dynamic patterns of the sequestration processes. The latter 
restrict the sequestration potential of GHG mitigation for both biophysical and 
economic reasons. 
First, depending on the type of activity, the removal of atmospheric CO2 through 
sequestration may be offset by enhanced emissions of nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane 
(CH4). Increasing emissions of CH4 must particularly be expected following the 
restoration of cultivated peatlands, while the net GHG effect of conservation tillage 
                                                 
4    The various options and costs of GHG mitigation from agriculture have also been investigated in 
different European countries with the use of integrated assessment models, but with less emphasis on 
the examination of particular sequestration measures and without explicit assessment of marginal 
sequestration costs (e.g., De Cara and Jayet, 2000; Hartmann et al., 2008; Lehtonen et al., 2006). – 7 – 
might be reduced or even completely offset by additional N2O emissions due to higher 
residue returns and denitrification rates (Leifeld et al., 2003: 90; Li et al., 2005). In 
contrast, grassland extensification may be a promising option for reducing N2O 
emissions, while any extension of permanent grassland may induce CH4 emissions if the 
additional grass is fed to ruminants (Lehmann and Hediger, 2004). Thus, to 
comprehensively evaluate carbon sequestration potentials and agricultural GHG 
mitigation strategies it is important to take the various interdependencies of crop and 
livestock management into account (McCarl and Schneider, 2001; Hediger, 2006). 
Second, since carbon sequestration is a dynamic process of carbon accumulation in soils 
and biomass, special attention must be given to the issue of saturation and permanence. 
As emphasised in the IPCC special report, the rate of soil carbon sequestration 
following a particular change in land use or management practice cannot be sustained 
indefinitely. Rather, the temporal pattern of soil carbon accumulation can be represented 
as a non-linear process which describes the shift to a new equilibrium carbon stock 
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Figure 1. The sequestration curve and average sequestration rate  
[Adapted from Watson et al. (2000: 201)] – 8 – 
In general, the rate of carbon gain following application of a given land use or 
management practice will decrease over time. Rates of change in the soil carbon stock 
observed during initial periods after adoption of sequestration activities are usually 
higher than the average rates that are generally reported by scientists (cf. Watson et al., 
2000), and decrease toward zero when saturation is achieved (West and Six, 2007). This 
process is illustrated in Figure 1 with the solid line representing the idealised 
accumulation curve, while the dashed line represents the simplified linear time path that 
implies the average rate of carbon sequestration q.  
Third, the issue of permanence is related to the fact that sequestered carbon in the soil 
constitutes a potential source and may be released again in the future if farmers would 
return to original land use and management practices (IPCC, 2000; Marland et al., 
2001a, b; Antle and McCarl, 2002; Feng et al., 2002; Vercammen, 2002; Antle and 
Diagana, 2003; Thomassin, 2003).
5 For the design of an economically efficient policy, 
it is therefore essential to account for potential future releases of sequestered carbon and 
the opportunity cost of maintaining carbon in the soil. Correspondingly, the time 
horizon in economic analyses and contract design must be extended beyond the point of 
saturation. Moreover, the non-linearity of the carbon accumulation process must 
adequately be taken into account. This is investigated in the remainder of this paper, 
starting with a general representation of the allocation and incentive problem and a fist 
investigation into the cost of permanence using a simplified linear model. 
3  Economic incentives for soil carbon sequestration 
As mentioned above, the economic incentive problem can be formalised as a contract 
between buyers and sellers of carbon sequestration services. Such contracts are 
associated with two classes of costs: on-farm opportunity costs of sequestration and 
transaction  costs  (contracting and monitoring costs). The former depend on the 
opportunity cost of changing land use or management practices, divided by the rate of 
                                                 
5      See also Cacho et al. (2003) that provide a comprehensive analysis and comparison of carbon-
accounting methods in the context of carbon sequestration through reforestation. Further 
recommended reading on issues related to the accounting problem includes Murray et al. (2007) and 
Reilly and Asadoorian (2007). – 9 – 
soil carbon accumulation on a given piece of land. This cost is relevant for a farmer’s 
decision to adopt a particular land use or sequestration technique. The second class of 
costs consists of negotiation costs that are similar for different contract types, and 
monitoring costs that are presumably higher for per-ton contracts than per-hectare 
contracts.  
3.1 The farmers’ land allocation problem 
Following Antle et al. (2001, 2003) and Antle and McCarl (2002), a farmer’s decision 
problem can be formalised in terms of an economic allocation problem that maximises 
for each site the net present value of expected returns from a set of available production 
activities, using either a per-hectare or a per-ton payment scheme for carbon 
sequestration.  
3.1.1 Per-hectare  payments 
For a contract with duration T years and constant annual per-hectare payment g
is 
received for switching from management practice i to the sequestration activity s, a 
farmer’s decision problem is represented by 
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t the respective per-hectare profits of the 
two activities at time t. Moreover, x is the decision variable which takes the value x = 1 
for adoption of the sequestration activity or x = 0 for non-adoption. I
is represents the 
fixed cost per hectare of changing from system i to system s.  
To give a farmer an incentive to adopt the sequestration technique s, the annual per-
hectare payment must exceed the annuity value of the farmer’s overall period 







i) and without fixed cost of changing practices, the condition for entering into 
a contract can be simplified to π
s + g
is > π
i for all t. Rearranging, this inequality 
becomes 
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In this case, the farmer will benefit from the contract if his short-term opportunity cost 
of sequestration is less than the contract payment per period. This is a rule of thumb 
which only compares the variable cost of land use change per hectare and per year with 
the annual per-hectare compensation payment. It is used in similar form by Antle et al. 
(2001, 2003) and Pautsch et al. (2001) for the seek of tractability in empirical studies. 
Moreover, it can be taken as first step of an in-depth economic evaluation that uses less 
restrictive assumptions and takes a longer time horizon into account. 
3.1.2 Per-ton  payments 
In case of a contract with payments per ton of carbon sequestered, the following 
equality holds for the carbon price p:
 6 
 
is is q g p =  (3) 
Here, q
is denotes the average annual increment of soil carbon that can be realised with 
sequestration technique s until the level of saturation of soil carbon is achieved. 
Apparently, this implies that the contract duration cannot exceed saturation time, and 
therefore particularly involves the prospective problem of permanence. The condition 
for participation in the program is 
  ( )
is is is s i q c q p = π − π >  (4) 
In other words, the farmer has an incentive to accept the contract when the price per ton 
of carbon is greater than the short-term farm opportunity cost per ton of carbon 
sequestered, given the above assumptions.  
3.2  The cost of permanent sequestration 
With the payment schemes considered so far, farmers would have no incentive to 
maintaining the sequestered carbon in the soil beyond the end of the contract. Rather, 
permanent sequestration would require a contract offered to farmers which would 
establish continuous responsibility for sequestered carbon and provide adequate 
incentives. In principle, this could be realised through a rental contract with credits 
assigned when carbon is sequestered and debits accruing when carbon is emitted 
                                                 
6    We still assume constant expected returns, and the absence of fixed costs for switching from system i 
to system s. – 11 – 
(Marland et al., 2001b), or through an extension of the above per-hectare contract with 
compensation for the variable incremental cost granted as long as the sequestration 
practice is applied. 
To formally analyse the latter case, we extend the above analysis from a fixed to infinite 
time horizon. We assume again constant expected returns, but restrict our analysis to 
one single sequestration technology (land use or management practice). 
Correspondingly, we can omit the time index and the indices for different practices. 
Using a simplified notation from equation (2), the farmer’s short-term per-hectare 
opportunity cost of carbon sequestration is defined c = π
i – π
s
. This is the difference 
between the expected returns per hectare between the two practices. The fixed cost for 
changing practice is again denoted by I, and r represents the farmer’s interest rate. 
Assuming a constant annual per-hectare payment g∝ provided for application of a given 
sequestration practice, the net present value of a contract for permanent sequestration is 
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The contract would be acceptable to a farmer if this value is positive. This formally 
requires a payment stream that compensates at any time the incremental cost of 
cultivation plus the annualised capital cost:  g∝ ≥ c + rI.  
The same outcome could theoretically be achieved with a payment for each additional 
ton of carbon sequestered. This would be directly compatible with a carbon tax or a 
system of tradable carbon permits. In this case, the contract would commit the farmer to 
permanent sequestration, but only provide payments until saturation of soil carbon is 
achieved at time T ˆ . Assuming a constant payment p per ton of carbon, a constant rate 
of sequestration q > 0 for the sequestration period, and no further addition to the stock 
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To compensate the farmer for the total cost of sequestration, (c/r) + I, the annual 
payment pq granted for any addition to the soil carbon stock must be higher than the 
minimum annual per-hectare payment required in a contract with limited duration: 
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Thus, in the short term, the seller of the contract faces higher cost in case of per-ton 
payments than in the case with per-hectare payments. However, the net present value of 
total payments is in principle the same for both payment schemes: 
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T r pqD r pq  (9)   
with gmin denoting the minimum rate of payment required under the per-hectare scheme: 
gmin ≡ arg min {g∝} = c + rI.  
Hence, permanent sequestration can be achieved with either a contract that pays a 
farmer on a per-hectare or per-ton basis. It would, however, require higher annual 
payments and imply higher costs to the sellers of contracts than in the restricted static 
case presented in Subsection 3.1, where the challenge of permanence is not formally 
addressed. Moreover, our analysis has been restricted so far to the linear case that only 
considers the average rate of sequestration. Yet, to effectively assess the economic 
potential of carbon sequestration in agricultural soils and investigate the economic 
efficiency of alternative policies or contracts for soil carbon sequestration, one should 
further take into account the non-linearity and saturation of the sequestration process.  
4  Economic efficiency and the dynamics of sequestration 
Investigating the role of spatial heterogeneity, Antle et al. (2003) show that, for some 
agro-ecozones, the marginal cost of soil carbon sequestered under contracts with per-
hectare payments can be as much as five times higher than the marginal cost in case of 
contracts that provide payments per ton of carbon sequestered. On this basis, they 
conclude that contracting parties could afford to bear a significant cost (monitoring cost) 
to implement the per-ton contract in more spatially heterogeneous regions and still 
achieve a lower total cost per ton of soil carbon sequestered than would be possible with 
a per-hectare contract. This confirms the relative inefficiency of per-hectare payments – 13 – 
for carbon sequestration in the presence of spatial heterogeneity, and provides an 
efficiency-based argument for the use of per-ton contracts. The latter would be directly 
compatible with tradable carbon permits and other efficiency-oriented government 
programs to mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, we only consider per-ton 
payments in our further analysis of economic efficiency and dynamics of soil carbon 
sequestration. In principle, this requires a comparison of different GHG mitigation 
options with respect to their marginal cost per ton of carbon equivalent. Moreover, the 
analysis must be based on consideration of effective rates of sequestration, rather than 
average rates. Using the latter would not in general lead to an economically efficient 
outcome.  
Since soil carbon accumulation is a non-linear process of transition between two 
equilibria, effective rates of soil carbon sequestration are not constant over time. As 
drawn in Figure 1, sequestration rates are usually higher at initial stages of the 
sequestration process and decline with soil carbon accumulation over time. Formally, 
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 (10)   
where St denotes the current soil carbon stock at time t, S0 the initial equilibrium stock at 
time t = 0,  S ˆ  the level of saturation that would be achieved at saturation time T ˆ , and 
φ(St) the effective sequestration rate at time t. 
The decline of the sequestration rate with the stock of soil carbon is also crucial from an 
economic efficiency point of view. The instantaneous payment which a farmer should 
receive for sequestering carbon under this regard is state and time dependent:
7 
 ) ( t t t S p g φ =  (11)   
                                                 
7    This corresponds to the equality in equation (3), but assumes a state-dependent sequestration rate 
φ(St) rather than the constant rate q. – 14 – 
Hence, the incentive to sustain the sequestration process and permanently maintain 
carbon in the soil may diminish with the accumulation process. To further examine this 
issue, we first analyse the concave problem without a penalty for future carbon releases. 
Then, we introduce a charge for carbon releases and furthermore examine the effect of 
an increasing carbon price.  
4.1  Optimal sequestration without penalty for releasing carbon 
To investigate the impact of declining rates of soil carbon accumulation upon a farmer’s 
optimal choice, we first consider a contract with flexible terminal time, which grants 
him a fixed and constant price p per ton of effectively sequestered carbon but not 
charges him for the subsequent release. In analogy to Section 3, we furthermore assume 
constant expected returns over time and constant marginal cost of sequestration per 
hectare  c. But, as an extension of the above model, we consider the non-linear 
sequestration function of equation (10). Consequently, the net present value of the 
contract to an individual farmer is: 
  [] I dt c S p e V
x T
t
rt x − − = ∫
−
0
0 ) ( φ  (12)   
In this case, the farmer’s decision is not only about the adoption of a particular 
sequestration practice, but also about the optimal time horizon T
x. Formally, the latter is 
determined by 
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Hence, at the optimal terminal time, the rate of sequestration (the slope of the 
sequestration curve in Figure 1) must be strictly positive: 





T φ  (14)   
Thus, it would be optimal from a farmer’s perspective to terminate the contract at time 
T T
x ˆ < , this is before saturation of the soil carbon stock is achieved ( S S
x
T ˆ < ). In other – 15 – 
words, farmers might be given an incentive to stop sequestration before the saturation 
point is reached. 
This conclusion does not fundamentally change, if the carbon price is not constant. 
Rather, if it increases over time at a rate α > 0, such that the instantaneous price is 
pt = pe
αt, the net present value of the contract to an individual farmer is: 
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and condition (14) changes to 






























 (16)   
with 
x T ~  and 
x
T S ~  denoting the optimal terminal time and terminal stock in this modified 
case. 




T S S > ~  and 
x x T T > ~  for α > 0, and vice versa for α < 0. 
Thus, the optimal terminal point to the farmer is postponed to higher levels of soil 
carbon for increasing carbon prices (α > 0), while the economic sequestration period 
would be curtailed and the maximum stock of soil carbon be lowered in the case with 
declining carbon prices (α < 0) but without a charge for released amounts of carbon. 
In short, our analysis of the case without for the release of sequestered carbon shows 
that it would be optimal from a farmer’s perspective to terminate the contract before the 
saturation point is achieved and return to the original land use and management practice. 
However, this is not efficient from a social point of view, since economic efficiency 
also requires charging farmers for the release of carbon, rather than solely paying 
(subsidising) them for the absorption of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and 
sequestering carbon in their soils.  
4.2  Optimal sequestration if future carbon release is charged 
If farmers would be charged a penalty for the release of sequestered carbon, then the 
above result changes. To investigate this effect, we first assume a contract paying a 
farmer a fixed price p per ton of carbon sequestered through conservation tillage, for 
instance, and charging him the same price per ton C for any future release of soil carbon – 16 – 
that results from ploughing after a sequestration period of duration  T T ˆ
0 ≤ . In this case, 
the net present value of the contract for the first “sequestration-tillage rotation” is 
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with XTo denoting the amount of carbon released from the soil due one-time tillage at 
the end of the sequestration period. 
Through the tillage of the soil and release of carbon, the farmer brings himself in the 
position to enter a new sequestration contract at time T0+1 for which the same logic 
applies as above. Accordingly, a rational farmer would be advised to maximise not only 
the net present value V0
* of the first sequestration-tillage sequence, but also to take into 
account the net present value of future sequestration-tillage sequences n = 1,…, ∝: 
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with Tn denoting the optimal duration of the nth sequestration contract and XTn the 
amount of carbon that would be released in case of tillage at the end of the nth 
sequence. 
Crucial for determining the optimal duration of a sequestration contract are the values of 
p, c, I and r but also the sequestration function φ(S) and the carbon-release rate XTn. If 
the latter would be zero, we could simply apply the case presented in the previous 
subsection. However, the occasional tillage of agricultural soils may result in a partial 
loss of the previously sequestered carbon. Quincke et al. (2007), for instance, report on 
different results found in the literature ranging from complete loss of the sequestered 
carbon due to a one-time inversion tillage operation (e.g. Stockfish et al., 1999) to the 
observation that tillage did not cause significant losses of total or labile soil organic 
carbon. – 17 – 
4.2.1  Complete loss of the sequestered carbon 
For analytical purposes and mathematical tractability, we start with the simplifying 
assumption that the sequestered carbon will be completely released due to one-time 
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In this stylised case, each new contract has the same length T




* – I at the beginning of each contract period. Thus, the net present value of 
the infinite sequence with sequestration-tillage rotation, assuming a constant carbon 
price p, is: 
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   (21) 
Accordingly, the farmer could accept the contract if the NPV > 0, which is the case only 
if the value of a single rotation V
* exceeds the fixed cost I by the factor (1 – e
–r(T*+1)). 
Yet, the value V
* is not exogenous. Rather, it is the result of the economic optimisation 
process which is to determine the optimal length of the sequestration contract and the 
optimal tillage time T
*. The corresponding first-order optimality condition is:  
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which results in 
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Using 
                                                 
8   This assumption will be relaxed in the next subsection. – 18 – 
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   (26) 
Optimal tillage time is given if the farmer’s capitalised instantaneous opportunity cost 
of tillage equalizes the total value of the contract, net of the initial investment cost. At 
this instance in time, the farmer would not only have to pay the charge  ] [ 0
* S S p T −  for 
releasing carbon, but should also take into account the total value of foregone net 
revenue from sequestration due to postponing this event by one more period.
9  
Furthermore, the optimal rate of sequestration at terminal time T

































= φ    (27) 
Taking into consideration that the rate of sequestration is declining with the stock of soil 
carbon S,
10 it would be optimal for a farmer to sequester carbon in the soil as long as 
long as the current rate of sequestration φ(St) exceeds the optimal rate φ(ST
*), that is, as 
long as φ(St) > φ(ST
*). In contrast, it would be optimal to interrupt sequestration if 
equation (27) is satisfied and if the net present value, e
–rV
*/(1–e
–r(T*+1)), of all the 




 S0]. In this case, it is optimal for the farmer to till the soil and, one period later, 
to restart the cyclical process with sequestration and tillage, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
                                                 
9   The latter is represented by the first term on the LHS in equation (26). 













Figure 2. Cyclical pattern of a sequestration-tillage rotation – illustration assuming a 
constant carbon price and complete release of sequestered carbon 
Compared to the situation without penalty for releasing carbon, the optimal tillage time 
T
* is earlier than in the case without penalty for releasing carbon (Section 4.1); i.e. 
T
* < T
x. This is due to the fact that because of  p c p e c
r / ] ) 1 /[( > −
−  and 
[ ] 0 ) 1 /( 0
* ) 1 ( *
*
> − − −
+ − S S p e V T
T r  we have  p c S S
x
T T / ) ( ) (
* = > φ φ  and thus 
x
T T S S <
* .
11 
4.2.2  Partial loss of the sequestered carbon 
Qualitatively, the above result remains the same if we relax the simplifying assumption 
of the complete loss of the sequestered carbon due to one-time tillage. Instead, we 
assume that only a fraction 0  <  β  <  1 is effectively lost to the atmosphere. As a 
consequence, the penalty for releasing carbon is lower than in the previous case, such 
that equation (17) changes to 
  [] ∫ ∫

















rt dt S p e I dt c S p e V φ β φ  (28)   
                                                 
11  Cf. equation (14). – 20 – 
with 
* *
0 T  denoting the optimal terminal time of the first rotation in the case with β < 1. 
Moreover, equation (20) is replaced by  
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0 0
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0 NPV e V NPV






















 (30)   
The latter denotes the net present value of the infinite sequestration-tillage rotation at 
time 1
* *
0 + T , and 
* *
n T  and 
* *
n V  the optimal length and value of the nth rotation. The 
value of this rotation (contract), with XTn denoting the amount of carbon released in case 
of one-time tillage, is  
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Hence, the optimal duration of the first rotation is determined by the first-order 
condition 
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while according to equation (31),  0 /
* *
0 1 = dT dNPV .  
Thus, equation (32) can be replaced by 
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Figure 3. Optimal sequestration-tillage rotation when only a fraction of the sequestered 
carbon is released due to one-time tillage at the end of each rotation 
Accordingly, the optimal rate of soil carbon sequestration at the terminal time of the 
first rotation period is given by 
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 (35)   
Depending on the different price and parameter values, this rate can be larger or smaller 
than the optimal rate  ) (
*
T S φ  in the previous case, where we assumed complete release of 
the sequestered carbon after tillage; i.e. β = 1. In other words, it is an empirical question 
whether the sequestration period is made longer or shorter and whether the maximum 
stock of soil carbon is larger or small for lower values of β. Moreover, the optimal 
rotation period can no longer be assumed constant if β < 1, such as illustrated in Figure 
3 for the case with a constant carbon price p. 
Since β < 1 signifies that only some of the previously sequestered carbon would be 
released under the plough, for every rotation, the initial stock of soil carbon for re-
contracting must be higher than it was at the beginning of the preceding sequestration – 22 – 
contract. Hence, the optimal sequestration time must become shorter from one rotation 
to the next. According to equation (35), it is indirectly determined for the nth rotation by 
the optimal sequestration rate at the end of this rotation in the general form 
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 (36)   
Given the fact that the optimal values for the nth rotation depend on the NPV of all the 
subsequent rotations, we get an infinite sequence of recursive dynamic equations. Thus, 
to numerically solve this problem suitable algorithms and adequate empirical date about 
the sequestration process and release rate will be required. 
Since it would only be rational for a farmer to follow a sequestration-tillage rotation if 
the net present value of all the future rotations exceeds the instantaneous penalty for 
releasing carbon in case of tilling the soil, we have  





S φ φ = >  (37)   
Thus, the optimal rate of carbon sequestration at terminal time is larger under a contract 
that charges the farmer for releasing carbon than under a contract that does not involve 
any penalty. Accordingly, charging farmers for the release of carbon results in a lower 
stock of soil carbon before tillage and a shorter duration of an optimal contract. 
4.2.3  The effect of charging farmers for the release of sequestered carbon 
Altogether, we can remark that, even if a farmer would be charged for the release of 
sequestered soil carbon, it can be optimal to accept a contract that pays him for the 
additional amounts of soil carbon accumulated in course of time. However, the optimal 
duration of a sequestration interval – that is the time period until the first interruption of 
the sequestration process by tilling the soil, for instance – is shorter than in the case that 
only paid farmers for sequestration but would not charge them for the carbon releases. 
This follows from the fact that the expression on the RHS in equations (27) and (36) are 
both larger than the relative sequestration price c/p, which determined the optimal 
sequestration level in the previous case without penalty for releasing carbon.  – 23 – 
Consequently, the optimal stock of soil carbon at the end of the sequestration phase is 
smaller if farmers are charged for the release of carbon than under a contract that only 
subsidises farmers for sequestration. Moreover, a contract that compensates farmers for 
carbon sequestration and charges them for subsequent release provides an incentive to 
restart sequestration at the end of each cycle, such a visualised in Figures 2 and 3. Thus, 
an optimal sequestration contract can be designed with a flexible terminal time that is 
implicitly determined by optimal tillage time. Subsequently a new contract can start. 
Paying and charging farmers according to the absorption or emission of carbon, 
respectively, such a contract is in principle compatible with carbon trading schemes that 
determine market prices or carbon tax schemes that use intertemporal efficiency prices. 
4.3  Optimal sequestration with an increasing carbon price  
Since carbon accumulation and mitigation are a dynamic processes that imply gradual 
changes of relative scarcities over time, the carbon price will hardly remain constant 
(Falk and Mendelsohn, 1993; Sohngen and Mendelsohn, 2003; Veld and Plantinga, 
2005). Rather, to ensure intertemporal efficiency, the carbon price must increase over 
time at a rate that can be referred to as “carbon discount rate”, an extension of the social 
utility discount rate which also accounts for the rates of technical progress and 
disappearance of atmospheric GHGs (Nordhaus, 1982).  
To cope with this issue, we extend our analysis and let the carbon price exponentially 
increase over time. For simplicity, we assume that the rate of increase is equal to the 
discount rate r, and set pt = pe
rt. The fraction of sequestered carbon that would be 
instantaneously released through one-time tillage is again denoted by β, with 0 < β ≤ 1. 
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 (38)   
This value does not remain the same for each rotation. Rather, due to the rising carbon 
price, it increases over time. Assuming here for simplicity that the rotation lengths – 24 – 
remain unchanged (i.e., 
* * ~ ~
n T T =  for all n), which is the case for β = 1, the value of the 
n+1
st sequestration cycle starting at  ) 1 ~ (




















+  (39)   
With a rising carbon price and constant sequestration cost, it becomes increasingly 
beneficial to a farmer if he accepts the contract, even if he is charged for the release of 
carbon at the end of the rotation. However, this does not imply that a farmer must 
initially accept the sequestration contract. Rather, he may reasonably wait until the net 
present value of the first effective rotation exceeds the initial cost. In other words, he 
might reject any contract until the net payoff in the first sequestration phase covers the 
initial cost.
12  
For convenience, we define the point in time where the first accepted contract starts by 
t = 0, and the corresponding price by p0 = p. Thus, the entry condition in the first period 
is  0 ~ )] 1 ~ ( exp[ ~ ~
1
* *




+ − − =
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Moreover, the optimal length of the first sequestration phase is determined by  
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Rearranging this equation, we get the optimal rate of sequestration at terminal time 
* ~ T  
















= φ  (42)   
                                                 
12   Notice that the farmer would not accept the contract if the carbon price increases at a rate above his 
discount rate: α > r. As shown in the Appendix A, this would strictly result in a negative net present 
value of the contract. – 25 – 
Given equation (39) and thus  
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The optimal rate at the end of the n+1
st rotation is smaller than in the first rotation:
13 
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Accordingly, under the above assumptions, the optimal terminal stock 
* ~
Tn S  increases 
from rotation to rotation, such that a continuous increase of the carbon price over time 
may bring about a gradual approach of the saturation level. However, given the non-
linearity of the sequestration curve, the saturation level S ˆ  will never be achieved nor 
will the sequestered carbon be permanently kept in the soil as the optimal solution. 
Rather, a cyclical pattern with an extended sequestration period and one-time tillage at 
the end of the contract proves to be optimal, once the value of the contract in the initial 
phase exceeds the initial cost. Afterwards, it will be optimal for a farmer to repeatedly 
accept a new contract that pays him for sequestration and implies a charge for carbon 
release at the end of each rotation.  
Altogether, a continuous increase of the carbon price, such as suggested from economic 
theory (cf. Nordhaus, 1982), does not result in permanent sequestration of carbon in the 
soil, if incentive payments are required to initiate land use or practice change. But, it 
makes soil carbon sequestration increasingly attractive to farmers and gradually extends 
the length of the sequestration period and the maximum stock of soil carbon. However, 
it does not eliminate the incentive for periodical tillage and release of some fraction of 
the sequestered carbon.  
5 Conclusion 
The use of biological sinks for GHG mitigation is limited by natural and economic 
forces. These include the non-linearity and saturation of the dynamic process of carbon 
                                                 
13  The results in Appendix B show that this result ist he most likely to hold also fort he more general 
case with β < 1. – 26 – 
accumulation in the soil, which implies changes in relative costs and benefits of carbon 
offsets and embraces the problem of permanence, that is, the maintenance of the 
sequestered carbon in the soil. Like the sequestration process, permanence cannot in 
general be achieved without adequate incentives, such as payments that induce farmers 
to alter their land use and management decisions in order to increase the carbon content 
in their soils. Thus, the problem of saturation and permanence is not only relevant from 
a scientific and political point of view but especially from an economic perspective. 
First, carbon sequestration is a problem of cost sharing and efficiency. An incentive 
scheme with permanent payment to maintain saturated carbon sinks over time would be 
extremely costly to society. Furthermore, economic efficiency requires that subsidies or 
compensation payments granted for sequestering additional amounts of carbon must be 
stopped at the latest when the level of saturation is reached. This would give farmers an 
instantaneous inducement to change behaviour and reverse the sequestration effect 
again, as soon as the payments are stopped. As a consequence, a major part of the 
sequestered carbon would be released into the atmosphere. In other words, permanence 
can hardly be achieved in the strict sense that the stock of carbon in the soil is 
permanently maintained at an increased equilibrium level. Rather, the theoretical 
analysis in this article proves that a cyclical behaviour with an infinite rotation of 
sequestration and periodical tillage might be economically efficient, both from a 
farmer’s and societal point of view.
14 
Second, carbon sequestration is a non-linear process with declining rates of soil carbon 
accumulation. An incentive scheme that aims at achieving economic efficiency 
therefore should grant payments according to these effective rates. As a consequence, a 
farmer’s decision is not only about the adoption of a particular sequestration practice, 
but also about the optimal terminal time of the individual sequestration program 
(contract). With positive marginal cost of sequestration, optimal timing always implies a 
positive rate of sequestration and a termination of the sequestration before the saturation 
level is reached, irrespective on whether farmers are charged for the release of 
                                                 
14   Notice that there are also scientific reasons for cyclical behaviour. It may, for instance, be necessary 
to periodically plough no-till soils to redistribute surface accumulations of phosphorus throughout the 
root zone (Sharpley et al., 1994). – 27 – 
sequestered carbon or not. But, when farmers are charged for the release of carbon, it 
would be optimal for them to till the soil at the optimal terminal time, pay the charge for 
the released amount of carbon, and then enter a new sequestration phase where they can 
receive sequestration payments again.  
Third, to ensure intertemporal efficiency, the carbon price must increase over time at a 
rate which is equal to the “social carbon discount rate”. In this case, it could be optimal 
for a farmer to postpone the acceptance of a sequestration contract until the moment 
where the net present value of the first sequestration period exceeds the initial cost. 
Afterwards, a cyclical pattern with sequestration and tillage will be optimal for him, 
even if he is charged for the release of carbon. Moreover, the increasing carbon price 
induces an extension of the duration of the sequestration period from one rotation to the 
next. However, for efficiency reasons, the maximum stock of carbon in the soil remains 
always below the saturation level. This must be taken into consideration when assessing 
sequestration potentials in agricultural soils and designing policies to provide adequate 
incentives to farmers in order to alter their land use and management practices with the 
intention to foster GHG mitigation through soil carbon sequestration.  
Altogether, it must be emphasised that, in general, permanence of soil carbon 
sequestration can only be achieved in a weaker sense that soil carbon is accumulated to 
an economically optimal level and, following perturbations (periodical release of 
sequestered carbon), achieved again at the end of each cycle of rotation, but not 
maintained intact over time. The optimal level that is periodically attained with a 
particular sequestration practice is below the maximum level of saturation, but 
increasing over time if the carbon price increases at a rate which is not above the 
farmers’ discount rate. Thus, the economic sequestration potential is restricted by the 
competing uses of agricultural land and due to the non-linearity and saturation of the 
carbon accumulation process in the soil. This must, in particular, be taken into 
consideration when designing policy schemes that aim at inducing an economically 
optimal portfolio of GHG mitigation measures.  – 28 – 
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Appendix A 
If we shall assume that the carbon price increases over time at a rate α > r then the 
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Since  α > r, it is  0 ] [
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0 T t∈ . Consequently, we get 
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0 < V , saying that the net present value of the sequestration program in equation (A1) 
is negative.  
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can either be positive or negative, depending on the relative prices and parameter 
values. 
 – 32 – 
Appendix B 
If we relax the assumption of a fixed duration of the different sequestration periods, 
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As a consequence,  0 ~ / ~ *
0 1 > V d V P dN , such that the first-order condition for the first 
rotation is  
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 (B5)   
Assuming that the costs and benefits of postponing tillage by one time unit remains the 
same from one rotation to the next, the optimal rate of carbon sequestration at the 
terminal time of each rotation increases over time and the maximum stock of soil carbon 
gradually approaches the level of saturation. However, there is always an incentive for 
periodical tillage, such that permanence in the strict sense cannot be achieved. 